In both thematic and chronological coverage, the story, as outlined, is typical of historical explanations of the relative fortunes of American cities. It treats differential urban growth as the product of an intraregional competition that was over by the twentieth century. On closer examination, however, the Portland-Seattle case does not match the standard model as closely as supposed. The recent experience of the two cities demonstrates the continued volatility of urban fortunes within a regional context, as new sources and avenues of growth have emerged with the expanding scale of economic activity. The case invites an alternative explanation for differential urban growth that emphasizes national and international connections, in addition to regional roles. The history of the two cities reconfirms the importance of specific events and choices, but the point of divergence lies sixty years closer to the present than often thought. In addition, many of the crucial decisions have involved the public, rather than the private, sector.
The "Alaska thesis" of Seattle's ascendancy fits within the common historical model of interurban competition in the nineteenth-century United States. Baltimore and Philadelphia, St. Louis and Chicago, and scores of other urban rivals provide comparable stories in which active and foresightful entrepreneurs in one city capitalized on commercial opportunities potentially available to both. In turn, the trade of the newly acquired hinterland supported further growth of the successful city and increased its competitive advantage in future rivalries. The model is especially apt for the era of continental expansion, when the progress of settlement involved the allocation of newly opened frontiers among new commercial centers." Indeed, historical studies of urban rivalries and urban imperialism mirror the nineteenth-century understanding of urban growth as the product of territorial control of resources and trade.'2 A spatially-rooted explanation of differential urban growth also matches the basic assumptions of central place theory. One of the key models in modern quantitative geography, central place theory, was developed in Germany in the 1930s, introduced in the United States in the 1940s, and tested against American evidence in the 1950s and 1960s. The theory argues that there is a correspondence between the size of a city, the variety of functions it performs for a surrounding hinterland, and the size or purchasing power of that hinterland. The wider a city's spatial reach, the broader its range of businesses and the larger its population. A city that captures a new customer base (such as Alaska) or enjoys a rapidly developing hinterland (such as the Columbia Plateau) positions itself for economic diversification and growth in the level of economic activity. The final result in a developing region is a nested hierarchy of towns and hinterlands that builds successively from crossroads stores through small towns to comprehensive regional centers. 13 The structured propositions of central place theory recognize the resources and demands of a city's hinterland as the essential engine of that city's growth.'4 In historical terms, the process of interurban competition has determined relative positions in the hierarchy of central places. For newly settled frontiers such as the Pacific Northwest, where each ambitious town started nearly equally, it requires historical analysis to understand how Seattle eclipsed Everett, or how Portland squeezed out Oregon City. This regional approach to urban growth has been particularly congenial to American urban historians because it emphasizes local decisions and sources of information, and is compatible with practicable case studies. It also ties the subfield of urban history to the wide historical interest in the expansion of the continental resource frontier. 15 An alternative model that emphasizes extra-regional networks as key determinants of urban growth may offer greater relevance to the processes of urban development in the twentieth century, which has been marked by basic changes in the sectoral composition and spatial patterns of economic activity. Several historians who have taken on topics with broad spatial and temporal sweep have described dual urban systems in which a set of regionally based cities co-exists with a second set of cities oriented to national or transnational networks. Studying late imperial China, G. William Skinner found that one hierarchy of towns and cities served regional trading needs with few connections outside their local hinterlands. The hierarchy developed from the bottom up with the expansion of local and provincial commerce in accord with the assumptions of central place theory. A second hierarchy of administrative centers, in contrast, was created from the top down by imperial agents and functioned as a single network of centers for control and information transmission.'6 Edward W. Fox divided premodern France into two sub-areas and urban systems based on different patterns of exchange. Central and interior France was a territorial society organized around local trade between provincial cities and regional agricultural hinterlands. The commercial society of the west-14 Although they start with large metropolitan centers rather than small towns, functional classifications of American cities have shared an interest in the regional sources of urban growth. Otis Dudley Duncan et al., Metropolis and Region (Baltimore, 1960) described a national urban hierarchy with a handful of truly national cities and a second tier of eight "regional metropolises" including Portland and Seattle. This second group is characterized by its special dependence on commercial and financial services performed for regional hinterlands. More recently, Thomas Stanback and Thierry Noyelle, in The Economic Transformation of American Cities, identified nineteen "regional diversified advanced service centers" that again include Seattle and Portland. The economies of such cities are dominated by regionally oriented transporation, utility, retail, banking, and wholesaling services. 15 Table 1 Given the similar roles of the two cities, Seattle's more rapid growth tied directly to the development of its hinterland. For comparative analysis, Portland's primary hinterland is defined as Oregon and three adjacent counties in southwestern Washington, with southwestern Idaho as its secondary hinterland. Seattle's primary hinterland is the remainder of Washington, while Alaska, the Idaho panhandle, and western Montana are its secondary hinterland.26 As an estimate of effective market size, population is weighted at 1.0 in the primary hinterlands and at 0.5 in the secondary hinterlands, where other cities competed for market share (see Table 2 Table 2 , Column 1). If the populations of the two cities themselves are excluded from the hinterland totals, the ratio increased by 25 percent (see Table 2 , Column 2). Table 3 suggest that such industries accounted for a stable proportion of total employment in each city from 1920 to 1940. War production jobs and wartime growth were also comparable.28 As late as the 1950s, outside observers thought that the two cities competed on an equal basis for the trade of the Pacific Northwest, with Portland gaining shipping and wholesaling at the expense of Seattle, and Seattle building a more diversified manufacturing base.29
Another indicator of regional relationships is the extent to which economic activity and population concentrate in a single "primate" city. High concentration may reflect both the absence of strong secondary cities, as in lesser developed nations, and the "overdevelopment" of a dominant city through participation in trading systems or other exchange networks external to its regional hinterland, as with medieval Venice or modern Miami.30 Table 4 Portland's strong competitive showing in the 1920s and 1930s was tied to continued growth in its farming hinterland in Oregon and southern Idaho. In contrast, the mining regions of Alaska, northern Idaho, and Montana were stagnating (see Table 2 ). The Seattle:Portland ratios of hinterland population declined by 13 to 17 percent between 1920 and 1940, showing the more rapid growth of Portland's trading zone. Data available since 1930 allow the population totals to be weighted by state per capita personal income, which gives a closer approximation of hinterland purchasing power. The weighting alters the individual ratios but not the trend (see Table 2 , Columns 34).
After a century of relatively stable competition, the regional sources of Seattle's advantage over Portland began to erode in the 1950s. If anything, Portland, rather than Seattle, reaped the greatest benefit from regional development and regionally-oriented activities. Even though Seattle's population margin over Portland grew from 20 percent in 1950 to 41 percent in 1970, the two hinterlands grew at essentially the same pace (Table 2 ). Seattle's increasing primacy after 1950 suggests that it has become less dependent on regional connections. Portland's decreasing primacy, in contrast, is caused by the more rapid development of its hinterland with resulting opportunities for regional trade and services.
Trends in specific industrial sectors support the conclusion that Portland, rather than Seattle, benefited most from regional functions after 1950. Before World War II, for example, Seattle's wholesale business was half again as great as Portland's. The results of the Portland and Seattle approaches were apparent in import-export data. The relative value of both import and export trade shifted to the advantage of Seattle between 1967 and 1977 (see Table 5 ). Portland retained its historic western role as an exporter of high bulk, low value commodities such as minerals, wood products, and farm products Ginsburg Index = population of largest city in region divided by total population of four largest cities in region Seattle and Portland regions defined as in 
